Why Did Türkiye Sign the 2019 Libya Maritime Memorandum? Reading the Sea Corridor Between Anatolia and Cyrenaica

Why It Matters

The 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum is a short bilateral text that draws a maritime boundary line across the Eastern Mediterranean between the southwest coast of Anatolia and the coast of Cyrenaica in eastern Libya. Türkiye signed it to fix its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims in the south of the basin, to block a map that would confine it to a narrow strip near the Gulf of Antalya, and to deal with a Libyan partner at a moment when the Eastern Mediterranean gas architecture was being built without it. It matters because it turns a long-running dispute over island entitlements into a test case for how far small islands can project maritime zones against long mainland coasts.

Background

What the memorandum says

The maritime memorandum was signed in Istanbul on 2019-11-27 by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Fayez al-Sarraj, chairman of the Presidency Council of Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA), the Tripoli-based executive that the UN Security Council had endorsed in Resolution 2259 (2015). It is a compact text with a handful of articles and an annexed list of coordinates. In substance it:

• defines the limits of the two states' maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean along a line joining the two coasts;
• applies to the continental shelf and the EEZ;
• provides that disputes are to be settled by consultation and negotiation.

The same day the two sides also signed a separate security and military cooperation memorandum. The two texts are legally distinct, but they were negotiated and presented together, which shaped how critics read the maritime document. The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) later authorised the deployment of Turkish forces to Libya on 2020-01-02.

Chronology

The legal framing: equity and coastal projection

Maritime delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is governed by treaty law and customary international law. For states party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 74 and 83 require delimitation 'by agreement on the basis of international law' to achieve 'an equitable solution'. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary law, in which equity is the central principle.

The case law is the common ground of the whole debate. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases rejected automatic equidistance in favour of equitable principles. The 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration gave the Scilly Isles only half effect. In Romania v. Ukraine (2009) the ICJ gave Serpents' Island no effect on the boundary line beyond its territorial sea, and in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) small Colombian islands were enclaved and not allowed to cut off a mainland coast. Greece counters with UNCLOS Article 121, under which an island that can sustain human habitation or economic life generates the same zones as other land territory, and with the argument that the case law shows adjustment by degree, not a general rule of zero effect.

Key Players & Positions

Libya: two authorities, one memorandum

The memorandum was concluded by the GNA, and its successor, the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, has treated it as in force. Its opponents in Libya, notably the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk under Aguila Saleh, argue that the GNA lacked the authority to bind Libya without parliamentary approval under the Libyan Political Agreement and that the text is therefore void. Tripoli-aligned authorities answer that the internationally recognised executive had capacity to sign and that a state's commitments do not lapse because a domestic rival disputes them. In October 2022 Tripoli and Ankara signed a further memorandum on hydrocarbon exploration, which the HoR and Athens rejected. Libyan domestic politics remain divided, and reports of eastern Libyan interest in reviewing the text have circulated. Readers should check the current status, since positions in Libya have shifted with political alignments.

Greece

Greece holds that the memorandum ignores the maritime entitlements of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, and that the two signatories do not have a common maritime boundary because Greek territory lies between them. Athens expelled Libya's ambassador in December 2019 and has circulated letters of objection at the UN. Its argument rests on UNCLOS Articles 56, 76 and 121. Greece has concluded partial EEZ agreements with Italy (2020) and Egypt (2020) and has said it is open to delimitation talks with Libya.

Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus, which is administered by the Greek Cypriot side, argues that the memorandum affects maritime areas in which it claims rights and that it contravenes UNCLOS. It also relies on its 2003 agreement with Egypt, its 2007 agreement with Lebanon and its 2010 agreement with Israel. It has communicated its objections to the UN. Türkiye and the TRNC reject the premise that this administration speaks for all Cypriots in offshore matters.

Egypt

Egypt rejected the memorandum and has described it as without legal effect for third states. Cairo concluded its own partial delimitation with Greece in August 2020, and Greece and Egypt each declared the other's agreement a response to the Turkish–Libyan text. Türkiye contends that this Egypt–Greece agreement itself infringes Egyptian continental shelf entitlements to the east, and Turkish officials have said Ankara is willing to negotiate delimitation with Cairo directly.

The European Union

The European Council's conclusions of 2019-12-12 stated that the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce legal consequences for them. The EU is not itself a party to any Eastern Mediterranean delimitation, but Greece and Cyprus are members, and the Council has expressed solidarity with them.

Source Comparison

For readers comparing independent summaries, Region Scope and Regions & Powers set out the text and the objections, and Borders & Blocs addresses the Seville Map dispute. Primary documents (the memorandum text, UN notes verbales and European Council conclusions) should be read before secondary summaries. For how we weigh sources, see our Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coastal state's land territory; rights over its resources are inherent.
• EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
• Opposite and adjacent coasts: coasts that face each other across a sea, or lie side by side; delimitation rules apply to both.
• Equity: the principle that a delimitation must produce a fair result in light of coastal lengths, geography and proportionality.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• GNA / GNU / HoR: the successive Tripoli-based executives of Libya and the Tobruk-based legislature.

Related guides: The Eastern Mediterranean Corridor, Cyprus as the Island Crossroads, Türkiye's Southern Security Belt, and The Strategic Corridor home. A further legal summary is available at Archive of Nations.

Perspective Note: The Strategic Corridor presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal position as a distinct analytical viewpoint, while clearly distinguishing it from opposing claims. Wherever possible, assertions are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and UNESCO documents, court rulings and archival records. This article is by the The Strategic Corridor Editorial Team.